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Abstract—Cryptocurrency wallets store the wallets private
key(s), and hence, are a lucrative target for attackers. With
possession of the private key, an attacker virtually owns all of the
currency in the compromised wallet. Managing cryptocurrency
wallets offline, in isolated (’air-gapped’) computers, has been
suggested in order to secure the private keys from theft. Such
air-gapped wallets are often referred to as ’cold wallets.’
In this paper we show how private keys can be exfiltrated
from air-gapped wallets. In the adversarial attack model, the
attacker infiltrates the offline wallet, infecting it with malicious
code. The malware can be preinstalled or pushed in during
the initial installation of the wallet, or it can infect the system
when removable media (e.g., USB flash drive) is inserted into
the wallet’s computer in order to sign a transaction. These
attack vectors have repeatedly been proven feasible in the last
decade (e.g., [1],[2],[3],[4],[5],[6],[7],[8],[9],[10]). Having obtained
a foothold in the wallet, an attacker can utilize various air-gap
covert channel techniques (bridgeware [11]) to jump the air-
gap and exfiltrate the wallets private keys. We evaluate various
exfiltration techniques, including physical, electromagnetic, elec-
tric, magnetic, acoustic, optical, and thermal techniques. This
research shows that although cold wallets provide a high degree
of isolation, its not beyond the capability of motivated attackers
to compromise such wallets and steal private keys from them.
We demonstrate how a 256-bit private key (e.g., bitcoin’s private
keys) can be exfiltrated from an offline, air-gapped wallet of a
fictional character named Satoshi within a matter of seconds1.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin [12] and Etherum [13]
have emerged as a popular medium of money exchange, with
a large associated ecosystem and supporting community. In a
nutshell, cryptocurrencies can be considered as a decentralized
payment network that is maintained by its users without the
need for a single authority. A global log known as ’blockchain’
records all of the transactions in the network. Each block
in the blockchain represents a number of transactions and
includes the transaction data, a timestamp, and a cryptographic
hash of the previous block. The distributed nature of the
blockchain makes it resistant to adversarial tampering of the
information contained in its logs, offering level of protection
that is inherently not possible with standard centrally managed
databases. The blockchain technology has also been adopted
by many other applications such as smart contracts [14],
medical records [15] and digital voting [16].
1demonstration video: https://cyber.bgu.ac.il/advanced-cyber/airgap
As of the time of this writing (April 2018), more than 3000
different cryptocurrencies are available on the Internet. Most
cryptocurrencies share the technology and implementation of
the larger cryptocurrencies like bitcoin.
The scope of this paper is relevant to all cryptocurrencies
and blockchain applications (e.g., smart contracts), although
in this paper we will largely focus on bitcoin, which is the
most popular cryptocurrency today.
A. Private & Public Keys
The whitepaper describing bitcoin was published in 2008
by an unknown person (or people) named ’Satoshi Nakamoto.’
The paper (”Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System”
[17]) was published on a cryptography mailing list and de-
scribed the bitcoin network principles. In bitcoin architecture,
the payments are performed by issuing transactions describing
the currency transfers between two peers in the network. Every
peer in the bitcoin network is referred to by a unique number
called a bitcoin address. Each bitcoin address is associated
with a public key and a private key. The public key is a 65
byte number and the private key is a 32 byte number (256-bit).
The public keys are published in the bitcoin network and they
are publicly available. Transactions, which are signed by a
private key can be verified by anyone using the corresponding
public key. The detailed process of performing transactions
in the bitcoin network is provided in the original whitepaper
[17].
Although there are various cryptocurrencies with different
cryptographic schemes and key sizes, the most popular cryp-
tocurrencies use 256-bit private keys. Table I lists the top-10
cryptocurrencies2 and the size of their private keys.
B. Cryptocurrency Wallets
A cryptocurrency wallet is a virtual object which refers
to the digital credentials of the currency holdings, and it is
essentially the public and private keys associated with a peer.
A bitcoin wallet contains one or more private keys, which
are mathematically related to the bitcoin addresses generated
for the wallet. Private keys are the most valuable asset in a
wallet as they can be used to transfer all bitcoins in a wallet to
2By market capitalization, according to https://coinmarketcap.com/ (April
2018)
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TABLE I: The top-10 cryptocurrencies/platforms and the size
of their private keys
Symbol Cryptocurrency Private key
BTC Bitcoin 256-bit
ETH Ethereum 256-bit
XRP Ripple 256-bit
BCH Bitcoin cash 256-bit
LTC Litecoin 256-bit
EOS EOS 256-bit
ADA Cardano 256-bit
XLM Stellar 256-bit
NEO NEO 256-bit
MIOTA IOTA 256-bit
another peer. They must be be kept secured and safe to avoid
theft and lost.
Some bitcoin wallet applications use a single seed to gen-
erate many pairs of public and private keys. This approach is
called a hierarchical deterministic (HD) wallet. In one of the
common implementations of this type of wallet, the seed value
consists of a random 128-bit value represented as a 12 word
mnemonic using common English words.
C. Types of Wallets
There are different approaches for managing cryptocurrency
wallets. At a technical level, they can be categorized into
software wallets, hardware wallets, and paper/brain wallets.
1) Software wallets: A software wallet is the application
which stores the public and private keys. It also manages
the bitcoin transactions, allowing clients to send bitcoins
and view their balance. Most of the software wallets today
provide a user-friendly control panel to view the wallet’s status
and perform online transactions. There are several types of
software wallets, and the most important of them are listed
below.
• Client-side wallets. Client-side wallets are applications
that the user installs on his/her PC, tablet, or smartphone.
The public and private keys are stored locally in a
wallet file. Many client-side wallet applications support
maintaining different types of cryptocurrencies.
• Web-based wallets. Web-based wallets are managed by
trusted third parties and can be accessed via online
websites. The private keys are stored in the provider’s
database and are not exposed to the client side.
• Watch-only wallets. Watch-only wallets allow the user to
track existing transactions but don’t allow them to initiate
new ones. Only the public keys are stored in the wallets.
• Cold (’air-gapped’) wallets. Cold wallets are managed
offline, disconnected from the Internet. Unlike online
wallets (hot wallets), cold wallets are not connected to
the bitcoin network and hence, can not initiate online
transactions. Since cold wallets are managed offline,
usually on an air-gapped computer, the private keys are
protected from online threats and thought to be safe
from cyber theft. Air-gapped wallets will be discussed
in Section II and Section III.
2) Hardware wallets: In hardware wallets the private keys
are stored in dedicated trusted hardware modules. They are
connected to the host computer via USB interface and com-
monly contain security features such as PIN codes and embed-
ded screens. In hardware wallets the transactions are signed
within a trusted computational environment in the hardware
(e.g., the ARM TrustZone), and the private keys are not
exposed to the host computer. The signed transactions are
delivered to the wallet application via a specific API provided
by the vendor of the hardware wallet. Hardware wallets are
less vulnerable to online attacks because the private keys can
not be accessed by malware in the host computer.Known
hardware wallets include TREZOR [18] and Ledger Nano S
[19].
3) Paper and brain wallets: In a paper wallet the private
keys are kept on a printed piece of paper. They are commonly
printed in a form of alphabet string or encoded as a QR
code. There are online websites that generate printable wallets
(e.g., www.bitaddress.org). Paper wallets are considered the
most secure, because they are completely offline and are
thus, largely unexposed to cyber threats. Similar to paper
wallets, in a brain wallet the private keys are not stored in
digital form. Instead, the wallet owner memorizes the wallets
mnemonic recovery phrase. If the mnemonic recovery phrase
are forgotten, the bitcoins are lost.
D. Wallet Security
The security of a wallet is correlated directly with the level
of security of its private keys. Hot wallets are always online
and hence, vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Attackers can inject
a malicious code into the host computer running the wallet
application using wide range of techniques including: com-
promised web-sites [20], drive-by-download [21], malvertising
[22], social engineering [23], malicious documents [24], and so
on. A malware in the host can easily access the file that stores
the private key(s) and leak them to a remote attacker via the
Internet. Several cryptocurrency stealing malware have been
found in the wild recently: ComboJack [25], CryptoShuffler
[26], and TrickBot [27]. Such online attacks are unavoidable
as long as the wallet is connected to the Internet.
Hardware wallets are physically connected to online com-
puters (e.g., when transactions are initiated) and can be con-
sidered hot wallets. However, the trusted hardware and secure
design provide logical isolation of the private keys, preventing
malicious code from accessing them. Note that hardware
wallets don’t provide hermetic security. In recent years bugs
and vulnerabilities were found in the implementation of hard-
ware components [28], [29], including in trusted execution
environments like the ARM TrustZone [30] [31]. These types
of vulnerabilities allow attackers to evade hardware-enforced
isolation mechanisms and access protected data.
Air-gapped wallets are thought to provide the highest level
of protection of the private keys - since the private keys are
kept in an offline computer, they are physically isolated from
the Internet and hence, cannot be accessed by hackers and
leaked out.
Table II presents the four types of wallets along with the
level of isolation they provide and the attack surface for each
wallet.
In this paper we focus on the vulnerability of air-gapped
wallets to cyber-attacks. In particular, we show that despite
the level of isolation, private keys can be exfiltrated from
such wallets to the Internet. First, we discuss the methods that
can be used by attackers to infiltrate the air-gapped wallets.
Second, we show that attackers can exfiltrate private keys over
the air-gap using special types of covert channels.
II. WALLET INFILTRATION
In this section we present techniques which can be used
by attackers to compromise air-gapped wallets and infect
them with malware. We also show that the infiltration of a
wallet can be done at a very early stage, before the wallet
software installed in the system and before the private keys
are generated.
A. Post-Installation
Although air-gapped wallets are kept offline, there are
occasions when external media is inserted into the air-gapped
host. This media might be a USB flash drive, an optical
disk (CD/DVD), or a memory card (SD card). The most
common scenario of introducing removable media to air-
gapped wallets involves signing and broadcasting transactions.
Signing transactions and distributing them online is commonly
done through an external USB flash drive. For example, in the
Electrum bitcoin client, signing a transaction in a cold wallet is
done via a file saved in a removable media device [32]. Once
the transaction is signed offline, the transaction file is moved
to the online wallet and broadcasted over the bitcoin network.
The same work flow is true for other wallet applications as
well [33].
The removable media transfers between online and offline
wallets can be used by attackers to infiltrate air-gapped wal-
lets and infect them with malware. Using removable media
(especially USB flash drives) to spread malware across PCs
is known to be effective. Research on this topic released by
PandaLabs [1] stated that 25% of all worms in 2010 relied
on USB devices to spread to other PCs. Out of 10,000 firms
infected with malware, more than 2,500 reported that the at-
tack had originated with an infected USB flash drive. Malware
such as Daprosy [3], CryptoLocker [2], Spora, [4] and ZCrypt
[34] used removable drives as a primary spread vector. In the
arena of advanced threats, many famous APTs used removable
media to infiltrate air-gapped systems, including ProjectSauron
[35], Fanny [9], Regin [8], Stuxnet [10] and Agent.Btz [36].
HammerDrill 2.0, disclosed in WikiLeaks in 2017, is a cross-
platform attacking tool that can use CD/DVD as a covert-
channel to compromise air-gapped systems [37]. The Brutal
Kangaroo framework, [38] also disclosed in WikiLeaks in the
same year, includes components which enable the infection of
closed networks via USB devices. In April 2018, researchers
exposed a file system vulnerability (CVE-2018-6791) which
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Fig. 1: Infiltration of an air-gapped wallet during the
transaction signing process. When Satoshi plugs the USB
flash drive into the air-gapped computer the system is
infected.
allows arbitrary command execution on Linux systems via
external thumb drives [39].
The use of such vulnerabilities and tools enables hackers to
compromise air-gapped wallets. The infiltration process is il-
lustrated in Figure 1. In the initial stage the Internet-connected
computer of the wallet owner is infected with a malware. Once
removable media is inserted into the online computer (e.g., to
copy the unsigned transaction file), it becomes infected with
malware. When the removable media is inserted into the air-
gapped computer, it then infects the air-gapped system.
B. Pre-Installation
The air-gapped computer might be compromised even be-
fore the wallet is installed, via an infected operating system
(OS) or compromised image of the wallet software.
1) Modified OS distribution / modified wallet: Attackers
can modify OSs and wallets on the download sites. In a famous
attack that occurred in 2016, hackers modified the Linux Mint
image file (ISO), inserted a backdoor into it, and managed to
hack the official website to point to the compromised image
[7]. In the same way, instances of wallet software might be
distributed with a built-in malware. Such attacks were shown
to be feasible in 2017, when an official version of CCleaner
was compromised and distributed with a built-in backdoor
[40].
2) Post-download infection: A cold wallet is commonly
installed in the air-gapped computer using an OS and a wallet
application that were downloaded from the Internet. They are
then uploaded to removable media (e.g., USB flash drive) and
installed on the air-gapped computer. Malware can infect the
removable media or the wallet image after the downloads and
just before its installation in the air-gapped computer.
Table III lists the attack vectors for air-gapped wallets.
Note that there are additional attack vectors such as supply
chain attacks and physical access [41] which can be used for
infiltration. However, because such attacks are often targeted,
and require a significant amount of funding and resources,
they require, we consider them less relevant threats for private
cryptocurrency wallets.
TABLE II: The level of isolation and attack surface of the private keys
Wallet type Isolation Attack surface
Hot wallets No isolation Online attacks (e.g., ComboJack [25], CryptoShuffler [26] and TrickBot [27])
Hardware wallets Logical isoaltion (hardware enforced) Hardware implementation bugs and vulnerabilities (e.g.,[30] [31])
Air-gapped cold wallets Physical isolation Air-gap infiltration and exfiltration (this paper)
Paper wallet, brain wallet Physical isolation Physical lost, theft, forgetting they mnemonic phrase, death, etc.
TABLE III: Infiltration vectors
Infiltration vector Infection method/stage Examples of past attacks
Removable media Wallet installation/Transactions signing [3],[2],[4],[34],[35],[9],[8]
Modified images
Modified ISO/
Compromised websites/
Post-download infection
[7],[40],[6],[5]
III. KEYS EXFILTRATION
Having a foothold in the air-gapped computer running the
wallet, allows an attacker to utilizes air-gap covert channels to
leak the private keys out. Air-gap covert channels are special
covert channels that enable communication with air-gapped
computers - mainly for the purpose of data exfiltration. In
2018, Guri coinded the term bridgeware [11] to refer to the
class of malware that exploits air-gap covert channels in order
to bridge the air-gap between isolated computers/networks and
attackers. The air-gap covert channels can be classified into
seven main categories which are discussed in the context of
the current attack model (air-gapped wallets) in this section:
physical, electromagnetic, electric, magnetic, acoustic, optical,
and thermal.
In this type of attack vector the wallet keys are transmit-
ted from the offline wallet to a nearby (online) computer,
smartphone, webcam, or other type of receiver via these
covert channels. The private keys are then sent to the attacker
through the Internet. In the next subsections, we discuss these
covert channels and examine the security threat they pose to
cryptocurrency wallets.
A. Physical (Removable Media)
As discussed in Section II, although cold wallets are physi-
cally disconnected from the Internet, a removable media device
(e.g., USB flash drive or CD/DVD) may be inserted into the
air-gapped host. Attackers can use this as an opportunity for
exfiltrating private keys. Note although such occasions might
be rare, one is enough for an attacker to leak one or several
private keys.
The most common scenario for the use of removable media
is for offline transaction signing. After a transaction is signed
in the offline computer, it must be broadcasted to the bitcoin
network. This can be done by transferring the signed transac-
tion file to the online wallet computer through a USB flash
drive [32]. For example, the bitcore-wallet manual for air-
gapped wallets states that ”Transactions can be pulled from
BWS using a proxy device, then downloaded to a pendrive
to be moved to the air-gapped device, signed there, and then
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Fig. 2: Exfiltration of the private keys during the trans-
action signing process. When Satoshi plugs the USB flash
drive into the air-gapped wallet, the private keys are stolen.
moved back the proxy device to be sent back to BWS. Note that
Private keys are generated off-line in the airgapped device.”
[42].
Using removable media to maintain covert channels is a
known techniques used by malware and worms [1]. The
HammerDrill [37] and Brutal Kangaroo [43] frameworks
disclosed in WikiLeaks in 2017 are capable of exchanging
data with closed networks via removable media. Similarly, the
ProjectSauron APT [35] is capable of exfiltrating data from air-
gapped networks via USB sticks. The same mechanism exists
in Equation [44], Regin [8] and Fanny APTs [45]. In the case
of Fanny, the APT creates a hidden storage area in the USB
flash drive, collects the system information, and saves it in the
hidden area. When the USB flash drive was inserted into an
Internet-connected computer the data was exfiltrated.
This attack vector is illustrated in Figure 2. When a USB
flash drive is inserted into the air-gapped computer (e.g., for
signing a transaction), the malware stores the private key(s) in
a hidden file/partition. Once the USB flash drive is inserted
into the hot wallet computer (e.g., for broadcasting the signed
transaction), the malware read the private keys and sends it to
the attacker over the Internet. Note that the extra I/O operations
of writing the private keys to the file-system in the flash drive
have a negligible effect in terms of time and are virtually
unnoticeable by the user.
B. Electromagnetic
Electromagnetic based covert channels have been studied
since the 1990s. Back in 1998, Kuhn et al showed that it is
possible to generate electromagnetic emissions from a PC’s
display cables [46]. They also showed that binary information
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Fig. 3: Exfiltration of the private keys via electromagnetic
covert channels. Satoshi’s private keys are transmitted to
the nearby smartphone via electromagnetic signals (e.g.,
AirHopper [48], GSMem [50], RADIoT [51]) and sent to
the attacker through the Internet.
can be modulated on top of the emitted signals. Based on
this work, Thiele [47] presented a program which uses the
computer monitor to transmit AM radio signals modulated
with audio. He demonstrated the method by transmitting the
tune Beethoven piece, ”Letter to Elise,” and showed how it
could be heard from a simple radio receiver located nearby.
Although the existence of electromagnetic covert channels has
long been known, since a radio receiver needs to be located
close to the emanating computer, this covert channel was
considered less practical for cyber-attacks.
1) AirHopper: More recently, Guri et al demonstrated
AirHopper [48], [49], a malware that is capable of exfiltrating
data from air-gapped computers to a nearby smartphone via
FM signals emitted from the screen cable. The covert trans-
missions are received by the FM radio receiver which is in-
tegrated into many modern smartphones. They also discussed
stealth and evasion techniques that help hide the malicious
transmission. In a case of an AirHopper attack, the effective
distance is a few meters from the air-gapped computer, and
the effective bit rate is 100-480 bit/sec. The AirHopper attack
can be used to leak the private keys from an air-gapped wallet
to the user’s smartphone in a few seconds.
2) GSMem: Similar to AirHopper, the GSMem attack
[50], enables leaking the data from air-gapped wallets to
nearby mobile phones. In this technique malware generates
interferences in the cellular bands of the GSM, UMTS, and
LTE specification. The signals are generated from the buses
which connect the RAM and the CPU on the motherboard.
The transmission can be received by a rootkit hidden in the
baseband firmware of a nearby mobile phone. In a case of
a GSMem attack, the mobile phone must be located close to
the air-gapped computer, and the effective bandwidth is 1-2
bit/sec. The GSMem attack can be used to leak the private
keys from an air-gapped wallet to the user’s smartphone in a
few minutes.
3) RADIoT: In the RadIoT attack [51] data can be leaked
from air-gapped embedded systems and IoT devices via radio
signals. The radio signals - generated from various buses and
general-purpose input/output (GPIO) pins of the embedded
devices - can be modulated with binary data. In this case,
the transmissions can be received by an AM or FM receiver
located nearby the device. This attack is relevant to cases
where the air-gapped wallet is maintained in embedded and
low-power devices, such as a Raspberry PI as suggested in
[52][53].In the case of a RADIoT attack, the private keys can
be exfiltrated at bit rate of tens to hundreds of bits per second,
depending on the type of device used. The RADIoT attack can
be used to leak the private keys from an air-gapped wallet to
the user’s smartphone or RF receiver in a few seconds.
The electromagnetic based covert channels are illustrated in
Figure 3. In this case, Satoshi’s private keys are transmitted
to the nearby smartphone via electromagnetic signals (e.g.,
AirHopper [48], GSMem [50], RADIoT [51]), and sent to the
attacker through the Internet.
C. Electric
In 2018, Guri et al presented PowerHammer [54], an attack
which can be used to exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers
through power lines. A malware in the air-gapped computer
controls the power consumption of the system by changing
the CPU workload. It encodes data on top of the changes in
current flow, which is propagated through the power lines. In
this work, the authors presented a type of attack named phase
level power-hammering in which the attacker probes the power
lines at the phase level in the main electrical service panel. In
the phase level attack, they were able to exfiltrate data at a bit
rate of 10 bit/sec. This attack requires the attacker to obtain
physical access to the electrical service panel where the air-
gapped computer is located. The PowerHammer attack can be
used to leak the private keys from an air-gapped wallet in just
a few seconds or minutes.
D. Magentic
The private keys can be leaked from air-gapped wallets via
magnetic fields.
1) ODINI and MAGNETO: The ODINI [55] and MAG-
NETO [56] attacks enable the exfiltration of data via magnetic
signals generated by the computer processors. Magnetic sig-
nals can also be generated from the reading/writing heads of
hard disk drives [57]. The receiver may be a magnetic sensor or
a smartphone located near the computer. One of the interesting
properties of ODINI and MAGNETO attacks is that the low
frequency magnetic fields can bypass Faraday shielding. Thus,
in the case on an air-gapped wallet, private keys can be
exfiltrated even if the wallet or receiver smartphone is enclosed
within a Faraday cage. The magnetic covert channels such as
ODINI and MAGNETO can be used to leak the private keys
from an air-gapped wallet in a matter of minutes.
E. Optical
The private key can be exfiltrated from air-gapped wallets
via optical signals. The signals can be received by a nearby
cameras, e.g., a webcam, smartphone, or security camera
with a line-of-sight with the air-gapped computer. Few optical
covert channels which are relevant to our attack model have
been proposed over the years.
1) Keyboard LEDs: Loughry introduced the use of PC key-
board LEDs (caps-lock, num-lock, and scroll-lock) to exfiltrate
binary data in an optical way [58]. The main drawback of this
method is that it is not fully covert. Since keyboard LEDs
don’t usually blink the user can easily detect the transmission.
2) Hard-disk-drive LEDs: In 2017, Guri et al presented
LED-it-GO, a covert channel that uses the hard drive (HDD)
indicator LED in order to exfiltrate data from air-gapped
computers [59]. The same authors presented a method for data
exfiltration from air-gapped networks via router and switch
LEDs [60]. In the case of HDDs and routers, the devices blink
frequently; hence, transmissions performed via these channels
will not raise the user’s suspicious. The router LEDs are less
relevant in the case of air-gapped wallets, unless the air-gapped
wallets are maintained in an internal network with switches or
routers.
The optical covert channels described above can be used
to leak the private keys from an air-gapped wallet to nearby
cameras in a few seconds.
3) Invisible image (VisiSploit) / QR stenography: In some
air-gapped wallets (e.g., BitKey [33]) the signed transaction
can be scanned from the screen rather than copied to remov-
able media. The signed transaction is shown in a form of
QR code on the computer display and can be scanned with a
standard smartphone. Guri et al showed that data can be leaked
optically through fast blinking images or low contrast invisible
QR code projected on the LCD screen [61]. The QR code is
invisible to humans but can be reconstructed by a snapshot
taken by the smartphone camera. In our case, the private keys
are covertly projected on the screen along with the QR code
of the signed transaction. When the user scans the visible QR
code, the invisible private keys are also scanned.
Another option is to hide the private key data within
QR codes to establish a stenography based covert channel
[62]. Using this method, the private key (or part of it) is
covertly embedded within the legitimate QR code of the signed
transaction. After the signed transaction is scanned by the
smartphone, the private keys are extracted and sent to the
attacker. This covert channel is illustrated in Figure 4.
F. Acoustic
In acoustic covert channels the private keys are exfiltrated
via inaudible sound waves. Hanspach [63] show how to
maintain an ultrasonic covert channel between air-gapped lap-
tops equipped with speakers and microphones. He established
communication between two computers located 19 meters
apart and achieved a bit rate of 20 bit/sec. Using the same
method, Deshotels [64] showed that data can be transferred
from computer to smartphone via ultrasonic waves. All of the
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Fig. 4: Exfiltration of an the private keys during the
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hidden in the signed transaction QR code. When Satoshi
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aforementioned ultrasonic attacks are relevant to environments
in which the computers are equipped with both speakers and
microphones. The ultrasonic communication can be used to
leak the private keys from an air-gapped wallet to nearby PC
or smartphone in a few seconds.
1) Ultrasonic (speaker-to-speaker communication): In
many IT environments desktop computers are not equipped
with microphones. To overcome this limitation, Guri et al
presented MOSQUITO [65] a malware that covertly turns
headphones, earphones, or simple earbuds connected to a PC
into a pair of microphones, even when a standard microphone
is not present. Using this technique they established so-called
speaker-to-speaker ultrasonic communication between two or
more computers in the same room. This attack is useful when
the air-gapped computer is located in the same room with a
microphone-less Internet-connected computer that is equipped
with passive loudspeakers or headphones. It can be used to
leak the private keys in a few seconds.
2) Fansmitter: Computer fan noise: In 2016, Guri et al
introduced Fansmitter, a malware which facilitates the exfiltra-
tion of data from an air-gapped computer via noise generated
from the computer fans [66]. In this method, the air-gapped
computer does not need to be equipped with loudspeakers, and
the data could be leaked through acoustic signals generated
from the computer fan.
3) Diskfiltration: hard-disk-drive noise: Guri et al also pre-
sented a method dubbed DiskFiltration that uses the acoustic
signals emitted from the hard disk drive (HDD) to exfiltrate
data from air-gapped computers [67]. Similar to the previous
attack, the air-gapped computer does not need to be equipped
with loudspeakers, and the data could be leaked through
acoustic noise generated by the HDD.
The Fansmitter and Diskfiltration methods can be used to
leak the private keys from an air-gapped wallet in a few
minutes.
TABLE IV: The air-gap covert channels relevant for private keys exfiltration
Type Method Recevier 256-bit key
Physical Removable and external media (E.g., USB flash drives) Computer <0.01 sec
Electromagentic AirHopper (FM signals emitted from the video cable [49], [48]) Mobile phone <1 sec
Electromagnetic GSMem (cellular interferences emitted from the CPU-RAM bus) [50] Mobile phone ∼300 sec
Electromagnetic RADIoT (radio signals generated by embedded and IoT devices) [51] Mobile phone/Dedicated receiver ∼1-50 sec
Electric PowerHammer (data exfiltrated thorough the power lines) [54] Dedicated receiver ∼ 30-300 sec
Magnetic
MAGNETO (magnetic signals generated by the CPU to smartphone) [56]
ODINI (magnetic signals generated by the CPU) [55]
HDD (Magnetic signals emitted from the HDD) - laptops [57]
Mobile phone ∼70-1000 sec
Acoustic Ultrasonic (generated by loudspeakers) [63] Computer/Mobile phone ∼1-20 sec
Acoustic MOSQUITO (speaker-to-speaker ultrasonic communication) [65] Computer ∼2-20 sec
Acoustic Fansmitter (acoustic signals generated by the CPU/chassis fans) [66] Computer/Mobile phone ∼1000-2000 sec
Acoustic Diskfiltraition (acoustic signals generated by the HDD actuator arm) [67] Computer/Mobile phone ∼100-200 sec
Optical Keyboard LEDs [58] Local camera(e.g., webcam) ∼50-100 sec
Optical Hard disk drive LEDs (LED-it-GO) (optical signals by HDD indicator LED) [59] Local camera(e.g., webcam) ∼10-100 sec
Optical Invisible images on screen [61] Mobile phone A snapshot
Optical QR code steganography [62] Mobile phone A snapshot
G. Thermal
In 2015, Guri et al presented BitWhisper [68], a thermal
covert channel allowing an attacker to establish bidirectional
communication between two adjacent air-gapped comput-
ers via temperature changes. The heat is generated by the
CPU/GPU of a standard computer and received by temperature
sensors that are integrated into the motherboard of the nearby
computer. Due to the low bit rate we consider this method as
a less relevant alternative for private key exfiltration.
H. Other Techniques
There are other air-gap covert channels that have been
suggested over the years which requires a hardware receivers
or transmitters as a part of the attack. We consider these covert
channels as less feasible for the attack model described in this
paper. For example, in 2016, Guri et al presented USBee, a
malware that uses the USB data buses to generate electro-
magnetic signals from a desktop computer [69]. Similarly,
researchers also proposed using GPIO ports of printers to
generate covert radio signals for the purpose of data exfiltration
[70]. Both attacks require a dedicated RF receiver in the
area. Lopes presented a covert channel based on a malicious
hardware component with implanted IR LEDs [71]. However,
in this method the attacker must find a way to attach the
compromised hardware to the target computer. In 2017, Guri
et al presented aIR-Jumper, a malware that uses security
cameras and their IR LEDs to covertly communicate with
air-gapped networks from a distance of hundreds of meters
[72]. This method is relevant only to corporate networks where
surveillance cameras are installed.
Table IV. summarizes the relevant air-gap covert channels
along with the estimation of time it takes to leak a 256-bit
private key in each covert channel.
IV. COUNTERMEASURES
Many of the countermeasures for air-gap covert channels are
adapted from standards and regulations for governmental and
military organizations. Although some of the regulations are
restrictive for personal users, they can be employed to some
extent for the maintenance of air-gapped wallets.
A. Infiltration
Anti-virus programs (AVs), host-based intrusion detection
systems (HIDs) and host-based intrusion prevention sys-
tems (HIPs) may be used to prevent the initial infection
of the air-gapped wallet with malicious code. Modern AVs
may employ static scanning and runtime analysis to ev-
ery file stored on the removable media device. However,
malware authors have repeatedly proven that they can suc-
cessfully bypass AVs, HIDs and HIPs by using zero-day
vulnerabilities and employing stealth and evasion techniques
[1],[2],[3],[4],[5],[6],[7],[8],[9],[10].
B. Exfiltration
It is possible to detect and block some covert channels
presented in this paper using behavioral analysis. For example,
hooking system resources and tracing the use of suspicious
APIs [50], [68], [65] have been suggested for identifying
intentional electromagnetic, acoustic, thermal, or optical trans-
missions. In this approach behavioral analysis, machine learn-
ing, and anomaly detection techniques may be used to detect
the presence of covert channels and raise alerts. As noted in
previous work on this topic, such forms of behavioral detection
inherently suffer from high false positive rates [50], [68], [65].
1) Policy-based countermeasures: At the policy level it is
possible to define a radius around the air-gapped wallet in
which computers, smartphones, cameras, and other receivers
are not allowed to cross. This approach is also known as
red/black isolation, and refers to a physical separation between
systems that may carry information with different levels of
classification [11]. However, such measures might not be
practical for private users. In addition, some air-gapped wallets
intentionally utilize smartphones for the transfer of transac-
tions between cold and hot wallets [33].
2) Hardware-based countermeasures: A basic hardware-
based countermeasure scheme involves shielding computers
with metallic materials to prevent electromagnetic radiation
from leaking from the shielded equipment. Shielding can limit
the effective range of many electromagnetic-based attacks.
However, it is less suitable for private users due to the
maintenance required and cost. When a highly valuable wallet
is involved, a signal jamming approach might be taken. In
this approach, a specialized hardware transmitter continuously
generates random noises that interfere with potential transmis-
sions from the wallet. Jamming is primarily used to block of
electromagentic and acoustic signals [73].
V. CONCLUSION
The threat of data exfiltration from air-gapped computers is
often discussed in the context of sophisticated cyber-attacks.
However, with the emergence of cryptocurrencies (e.g., bit-
coin) and the accompanying need to secure private keys from
online threats, it has been suggested that private users manage
their cryptocurrency wallets offline in isolated, air-gapped
computers.
We show that despite the high degree of isolation of cold
wallets, motivated attackers can steal the private keys out
of the air-gapped wallets. With the private keys in hand, an
attacker virtually owns all of the currency in the wallet. In
the attack model presented, the attacker infiltrates the offline
wallet, infecting it with malicious code. Then, by using air
gap covert channels, attackers can jump the air-gap and leak
the private keys to nearby online computers, smartphones, or
cameras. We evaluate the exfiltration techniques, including
physical, electromagnetic, electric, magnetic, acoustic, optical,
and thermal. We present a chain of attack that allows an
attacker to compromise an air-gapped wallet and exfiltrate the
private keys from it. We demonstrate how bitcoins private keys
are exfiltrated from an offline, air-gapped wallet in a matter
of a few seconds, using electromagnetic and acoustic covert
channels3.
3https://cyber.bgu.ac.il/advanced-cyber/airgap
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